National interest trumps permanent friendships forever
In the unforgiving arena of international relations, geography often dictates destiny. For Bangladesh, wedged between a dominant India and a volatile Myanmar, the timeless diplomatic maxim—hold friends and leave foes—has never been more relevant. As the country navigates the post-July 2024 revolutionary landscape, its foreign policy must place unyielding national interest above sentimental alliances, much like Israel has done amid existential threats.
The comparison with Israel is instructive. Created and sustained by Western backing, Israel confronts perpetual hostility from neighbours yet thrives through pragmatic diplomacy. Bangladesh, born with Indian assistance in 1971, has faced a different reality: New Delhi’s persistent desire for political oversight. Successive governments in Dhaka have learned the hard way that India views Bangladesh as remaining firmly within its sphere of influence. This hegemonic outlook, analysts argue, has been the root of bilateral friction for over five decades.
History bears witness. The August 1975 revolution briefly loosened India’s grip, but it was the Sepoy-People’s Revolution of 7 November that propelled Ziaur Rahman to power. He pivoted boldly towards the West, the United States and the broader Muslim world while rapidly strengthening ties with China—without alienating India entirely. Ershad continued this balanced approach. Even during Khaleda Zia’s tenures (1991-96 and 2001-06), foreign policy remained measured, though security incidents—from the 2004 grenade attack to the 2006 student killings—fuelled speculation of external destabilisation.
The 2008 election and subsequent years under Sheikh Hasina’s administration marked a return to perceived dependence. The 2009 BDR massacre, many observers believe, sought to cripple the armed forces’ cohesion. Hasina’s government was widely seen as aligned with Indian interests until its dramatic ouster in the July 2024 mass uprising. Bangladesh finally shook off both autocratic rule and overt external dominance.
Today, the interim administration under Dr Muhammad Yunus has signalled a shift towards “embracing friends and letting go of enemies.” The incoming government, expected to be led by figures such as Tarique Rahman of the BNP, inherits both opportunity and peril. India has extended a pragmatic hand—supplying 5,000 metric tonnes of diesel during acute shortages—and progress on the Padma River water-sharing treaty could rebuild trust. Yet Dhaka must insist on equal-footing relations. The era of “Big Brother” posturing is over; the Bangladeshi public’s post-revolution psyche demands respect for sovereignty.
Equally vital is deepening ties with Pakistan. In any future security contingency involving neighbours, Islamabad has repeatedly signalled readiness to stand with Dhaka. A robust Pakistan-Bangladesh partnership is no longer optional—it is strategic insurance.
Relations with the United States remain indispensable for economic and security cooperation, yet the current Middle East tensions place Bangladesh in a delicate bind. Moral sympathy lies with the Iranian people, fellow Muslims enduring decades of pressure since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Neutrality is the only viable course for a developing nation, and the government’s cautious stance is prudent. Similarly, China’s economic and infrastructural role is irreplaceable, but must be managed with diplomatic finesse to avoid friction with Washington and New Delhi.
Myanmar cannot be sidelined. The safe, dignified repatriation of Rohingya refugees hinges on Naypyidaw’s goodwill and, crucially, Beijing’s quiet influence. A pragmatic trilateral approach is essential.
The road ahead is complex, yet the guiding principle is simple: Bangladesh’s diplomacy must be professional, interest-driven and unflinching. No neighbour can be ignored, but none can be allowed to dictate terms. In this new era, the people of Bangladesh will accept nothing less than genuine sovereignty.
The current leadership possesses the tools and the mandate to chart this course. With balanced engagement across India, Pakistan, the United States, China and Myanmar—and a clear-eyed contingency plan for regional instability—Bangladesh can secure its future. National interest is not negotiable; it is the only compass that matters.
Dr S. K. Akram Ali Editor,
Military History Journal
